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Abstract: From 2021, an increasing percentage of the carbon emission growth in international air 
transport will be subject to offsetting under the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for 
International Aviation (CORSIA). Presently, it is still unclear if, and how, the existing EU emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) for aviation will continue. We assess the environmental impacts of different 
options (not) to continue with the EU ETS for aviation alongside CORSIA, and also discuss 
resulting monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) requirements. Our results indicate that any 
form of continuation of the EU ETS would have positive environmental effects especially in the 
early 2020s, when the coverage and environmental impact of CORSIA, which only tackles any 
post-2020 emission growth in international aviation, will still be low. If, moreover, a certain failure 
of CORSIA Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) to actually achieve emission reduction elsewhere 
is assumed, the environmental net benefit of CORSIA will be even lower. From both the policy and 
economic perspectives, these aspects may further strengthen the need to continue with the EU ETS 
for aviation. Possible options are to maintain the EU ETS in operation for domestic flights only, as a 
complement to CORSIA, or to keep it alive even for international flights within the European 
Economic Area (EEA), replacing CORSIA there as an equivalent measure. Another option to 
increase the environmental effectiveness of CORSIA, at least to some extent, could be to voluntarily 
extend it to domestic EEA flights. Administrative-wise, the CORSIA MRV system could be applied 
to a continued EU ETS to reduce transaction costs and to assure globally similar or even identical 
MRV standards, e.g., with regard to exemptions and eligible fuel monitoring methods. 
Keywords: air transport emissions; climate impact; EU ETS; CORSIA; emissions trading; MRV; 
offsetting 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1992, civil aviation (hereinafter also referred to as air transport) represented some 2% of total 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, or about 13% of all transport-related CO2 emissions 
[1]. The sector’s CO2 emissions subsequently rose at average rates of 1.8% per year until 1999, and of 
2.1% per year until 2005, respectively, resulting in slightly increasing shares of total anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions [2]. Counting only international aviation activities, the 2017 release of the 
International Energy Agency database “CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion” indicates total CO2 
emissions from fuel combustion of 32,294 million tons for the year 2015, including some 529.7 
million tons (or 1.6%) from international air transport [3]. Moreover, aviation’s total contribution to 
radiative forcing and, by this, to anthropogenic climate change, stems not only from the sector’s CO2 
emissions, but also from other gases and particulates like NOX, SOX, H2O, or soot. Considering this, 
Lee et al. estimated air transport to have contributed about 4.9% to man-made radiative forcing in 
2005 [2]. 
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As air transport continues to grow at enormous pace, with no substantial departure from fossil 
fuels in sight, the sector’s emissions and resulting climate impacts are likely to further increase. For 
instance, Airbus Industries expects an average worldwide growth in revenue passenger kilometers 
(RPK) of about 4.4% p.a. until 2037 [4]. 
Two international market-based measures have been designed and introduced to help reducing 
the sector’s carbon footprint, and, ultimately, reaching the UNFCCC 1.5/2.0 degrees goals [5]. One is 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which was extended to aviation in 2012. The other one 
is the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), which was 
agreed on at the 39th International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Assembly in 2016 after 
decades of difficult international negotiations. In full operation from 2021, CORSIA shall cover an 
increasing number of states. Both schemes aim at reducing the net climate impact of aviation as 
airlines have to surrender allowances (EU ETS) or offsets (CORSIA) for certain shares of their CO2 
emissions, both representing CO2 reduction elsewhere. 
However, the actual geographical scope and environmental effectiveness of the two schemes 
differ considerably. In its present form, the EU ETS for aviation is limited to flights within the 
European Economic Area (EU Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway; short: EEA), 
including domestic flights. Its cap is defined as 95% of the average historical emissions of the years 
2004–2006, i.e., the airline sector is required to buy allowances for all emissions exceeding this level. 
In contrast, CORSIA will be applied to international flights between participating states, while 
domestic flights are excluded. In addition, its baseline is less strict as airlines will have to surrender 
offsets for emissions exceeding average 2019/2020 levels only, and there are serious concerns about 
the offsets’ environmental integrity. Against this background, the EU will have to decide if, and 
how, to continue with the EU ETS for aviation—especially with regard to international intra-EEA 
flights which are, as matters stand, subject to both schemes. 
In this paper, we assess the environmental impacts of different options of continuing or not 
continuing with the EU ETS, and also briefly discuss resulting requirements for monitoring, 
reporting, and verification (MRV). Section 2 contains a literature analysis on the genesis and key 
provisions of the EU ETS for aviation and CORSIA, as well as the key differences between the two 
approaches. In Section 3, by applying region-pair specific growth factor estimates to a matrix of 
modeled CO2 emissions at the route level, we calculate future air transport emissions and investigate 
the emissions net reductions of different political options to fully or partly (dis)continue the EU ETS 
alongside CORSIA. In addition, we briefly introduce and discuss the two schemes’ MRV 
requirements and resulting administrative efforts associated with each of these options. Section 4 
concludes this paper. 
2. EU ETS vs. CORSIA 
2.1. Genesis, Key Functioning, and Impacts of the EU ETS for Aviation 
Neither the 2015 Paris Agreement by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [5] 
nor the 1997 Kyoto Protocol [6] do explicitly provide provisions for the limitation of air transport 
emissions. However, in the Kyoto Protocol, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
was tasked to prepare policy measures for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from 
aviation [6]. This marked the starting point of a long-lasting political process which eventually 
resulted in the October 2016 Assembly Resolution A39-3 on CORSIA [7]. 
However, reacting to slow progress at ICAO level [8], the EU had already introduced the EU 
ETS for aviation, its own, regional market-based measure regulating CO2 emissions from 
Community air transport. Initial legal frameworks for the EU ETS for aviation were the EU 
Directives 2008/101/EC [9] and 2009/29/EC [10]. 
The key functioning of the EU ETS for aviation is described in, e.g., [11], [12], and in a number of 
earlier papers, like [13] or [14], and illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Design of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for aviation. Own figure based on 
information from European Commission websites and legislations. Pictures taken from ec.europa.eu. 
Eex logo taken from eex.com. 
In brief, the EU ETS keeps net CO2 emissions from European air transport below average 
“historical” 2004–2006 levels, the so-called “cap”. For this, on an annual basis, tradable allowances 
representing one ton of CO2 each, which—in total—do not exceed the cap, are allocated to aircraft 
operators according to a certain benchmark and must be surrendered according to the carriers’ 
actual emissions. Any additional allowances have to be purchased from other airlines or stationary 
sources participating in the scheme, whereby EU Allowances (EUA) and permits from the 
Kyoto-based “Clean Development Mechanism” (CERs) and “Joint Implementation” (ERUs) are up 
to certain levels accepted for compliance. This way, annual air transport emissions beyond 2004–
2006 levels are compensated as the same amount of emissions is reduced elsewhere. Due to the 
actual cap, the environmental effectiveness of EUAs can be regarded as almost 100%, while, e.g., the 
effectiveness of CERs depends on requirements such as additionality (see also Section 2.3). 
To be more precise, until 2020, the cap is defined as 95% of average historical 2004–2006 
emissions, of which 82% are allocated for free, with the remaining ones auctioned (15%) or allocated 
to a special reserve (3%) for later distribution to fast growing airlines and new entrants [15]. From 
2021, as with the EU ETS for stationary sources, a linear reduction factor of 2.2% will help further 
reducing the cap from year to year in order to meet the EU2030 climate goals [16]. 
Originally, almost all flights from or to EEA airports were planned to be subject to the EU ETS 
(“full scope”), except for some “de-minimis” provisions for certain flights performed under public 
service obligations (PSO), or for aircraft operators with annual CO2 emissions below 10,000 tons. 
However, in a response to strong international opposition and to ease the ongoing CORSIA 
negotiations at ICAO level [17,18], the EU’s “stop the clock” decision eventually reduced the 
scheme’s scope to intra-EEA traffic [19]. The resulting “stop the clock” or “reduced scope” regime 
was originally planned to last until 2016 only. However, by regulation (EU) 2017/2392 and to allow 
for a review of the CORSIA implementation, the EU decided to maintain this framework until 31 
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December 2023. In case of no revision, the regulation would provide for a return to the original, full 
scope regime from 2024 onwards [12,16]. 
The impacts of the EU ETS for aviation were assessed in a number of publications. Anger and 
Köhler reviewed ex-ante studies on the scheme’s environmental and economic effects, which all 
papers analyzed found to be small with expected single-digit emission reductions and almost no 
(−0.002%) GDP impact [13]. Preston et al. assessed the global coverage of the original and reduced 
EU ETS regimes, respectively [8]. They found that, as a result of the “stop the clock” decision, the 
share of worldwide emissions regulated by the EU scheme declined from 35% to a small 
double-digit figure. Papers from the airline perspective, assessing ETS-related costs for the carriers, 
include research from Albers et al. who expected the scheme’s likely cost effects to be rather small 
(between €9 and €27 per route for carbon prices of €20 per ton) and therefore unlikely to stimulate 
network reconfigurations [20]. A relatively new issue is a potential consideration of non-CO2 effects 
within market-based measures like the EU ETS, which would result in much larger cost effects 
depending on the length, route, and altitude of each flight [21]. 
2.2. Introduction and Design of CORSIA 
Almost 20 years after Kyoto, the 39th ICAO Assembly eventually adopted Resolution A39-3 on 
a formalized GMBM system in the form of the offsetting scheme CORSIA, aiming at supporting the 
goal of carbon neutral growth in international aviation from 2020 onwards (“CNG 2020”). 
Under CORSIA, subject to some exceptions, the air transport sector will be obliged to offset its 
post-2020 growth in CO2 emissions on international routes by purchasing carbon credits from, or by 
investments in projects that help reducing carbon emissions in other sectors with a higher potential 
and lower cost for quicker reductions. Tradable certificates or permits representing the right to emit 
one ton of carbon dioxide or its equivalent, so-called “carbon credits”, will be used for compliance. 
Consequently, airlines are expected to offset their emissions whenever this is cheaper than to reduce 
them directly. 
The carbon credits which will be accepted for compliance shall arise from emission reduction 
mechanisms (such as UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanisms CDM), programs, or projects 
which, in return, are supposed to deliver measurable reductions in emissions [18]. This way, ICAO 
aims at freezing international aviation’s net CO2 emissions at 2020 levels, while the other emissions 
reduction measures like new technologies, the use of alternative fuels, or operational and 
infrastructural improvements shall be further pursued. Operational and infrastructural 
improvements are not unlikely to actually generate traffic growth, though, which may even increase 
the need for an effective market-based measure. 
Based on Assembly Resolution A39-3 and the related Standards and Recommended Practices 
(short: SARPs) “Annex 16 to the Convention on Civil Aviation, Vol. IV” [22], Figure 2 depicts how 
CORSIA works. 
Firstly, worldwide air transport is split into flights within and outside of CORSIA’s scope, 
respectively. Emissions from domestic flights are covered by the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and do 
not fall under CORSIA [23]. Moreover, ICAO is only responsible for international air traffic. In 
addition, emissions from domestic flights, but also emissions from small operators (<10,000 t CO2 
p.a.), from small aircraft (<5.7 t MTOM), and rotorcraft, and from humanitarian, medical, and 
firefighting operations do not fall under the scheme (Assembly Resolution A39-3, §13). Military and 
governmental aviation is fully excluded as it is not subject to the Chicago Convention. 
In contrast, all other emissions from international air transport are, in principle, subject to the 
scheme. However, actual offsetting requirements will only apply to emissions from flights between 
participating states (“CORSIA-states”) (§10a). While emissions from flights between CORSIA-states 
and non-CORSIA-states, or entirely between non-CORSIA-states, will not be subject to offsetting, 
they still have to be monitored, reported, and verified (§10b, §10c) according to the internationally 
uniform standards of Annex 16, Volume IV. 
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In other words, actual offsetting requirements of any airline in the world will solely depend on 
actual emissions on routes between participating CORSIA-states, while the remaining emissions 
from international flights will still have to be monitored, reported, and verified. 
 
Figure 2. Design of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation 
(CORSIA). Own Figure based on [7], Paragraphs 10/11/13, and [24]. 
Offsetting under CORSIA starts in 2021 and consists of three phases: Pilot Phase (2021–2023), 
Phase 1 (2024–2026), and Phase 2 (2027–2035). 
In the Pilot Phase and in Phase 1, participation in the scheme will be voluntary (§9a, §9b). From 
2027, participation in CORSIA will be mandatory for all states except for small islands, least 
developed countries, land-locked developing countries, and states whose carriers have accounted 
for less than 0.5% of international RTK in 2018, unless they volunteer (§9e). 
As per July 2019, 80 states whose carriers represent about 77% of international revenue ton 
kilometers (RTK) have announced they will voluntarily participate from scratch (see Table 1). This 
list includes not only the EU states and other big players like Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Korea, 
Japan, Mexico, Qatar, Turkey, the UAE, and the US, but also smaller or developing states like 
Armenia, Botswana, Jamaica, or Zambia. The largest countries missing on the list are the BRIC-states 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 
Table 1. Voluntarily participating CORSIA states (as of 15 July 2019). 
1. Albania 
2. Armenia 
3. Australia 
4. Austria 
5. Azerbaijan 
6. Belgium 
7. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
22. Estonia 
23. Finland 
24. France 
25. Gabon 
26. Georgia 
27. Germany 
28. Ghana 
44. Malaysia 
45. Malta 
46. Marshall Islands 
47. Mexico 
48. Monaco 
49. Montenegro 
50. Namibia 
66. Serbia 
67. Singapore 
68. Slovakia 
69. Slovenia 
70. Spain 
71. Sweden 
72. Switzerland 
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8. Botswana 
9. Bulgaria 
10. Burkina Faso 
11. Cameroon 
12. Canada 
13. Costa Rica 
14. Croatia 
15. Cyprus 
16. Czech Republic 
17. Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
18. Denmark 
19. Dominican Republic 
20. El Salvador  
21. Equatorial Guinea 
29. Greece 
30. Guatemala 
31. Guyana 
32. Hungary 
33. Iceland 
34. Indonesia 
35. Ireland 
36. Israel 
37. Italy 
38. Jamaica 
39. Japan 
40. Kenya  
41. Latvia 
42. Lithuania 
43. Luxembourg 
51. Netherlands 
52. New Zealand 
53. Nigeria 
54. North Macedonia 
55. Norway 
56. Papua New Guinea 
57. Philippines 
58. Poland 
59. Portugal 
60. Qatar 
61. Republic of Korea 
62. Republic of Moldova 
63. Romania  
64. San Marino 
65. Saudi Arabia 
73. Thailand 
74. Turkey 
75. Uganda 
76. Ukraine 
77. United Arab 
Emirates 
78. United Kingdom 
79. United States 
80. Zambia 
Source: [24]. 
From 2021, when actual offsetting under CORSIA starts, the airline sector will be required to 
compensate any emissions from “CORSIA-flights” which exceed the average emissions from 
CORSIA-routes in 2019 and 2020 (“baseline”). For the baseline calculation by ICAO, all ICAO 
contracting states are obliged to report their carriers’ route-level RTK and emissions for 2019 and 
2020. Whenever additional countries join CORSIA in the future, the baseline will have to be 
amended accordingly. 
Actual offsetting occurs at the carrier level, under supervision of the responsible competent 
authority. To calculate an airline’s offsetting obligation for the reporting years 2021 to 2029, its 
individual emissions from CORSIA-routes have to be multiplied by the sectoral emission growth 
rate (over all carriers) on CORSIA-routes since the baseline period (§11). 
Example:  Airline A’s emissions on CORSIA routes amount to 4,912,000 tons of CO2 in 2021. The 
airline sector’s emission growth on CORSIA-routes between the baseline period and 2021 
is 3.8%. Airline A’s offsetting requirement for 2021 is calculated as: 4,912,000 × 0.038 = 
186,656 tons of CO2. 
The idea behind applying the average sectoral mission growth uniformly to all carriers in the 
early years is a political compromise in an attempt to achieve the right balance between the 
offsetting requirements for established and younger carriers, respectively. Otherwise, young and 
fast-growing airlines, like the ChiBoGu (the abbreviation ChiBoGu refers to fast-growing carriers 
from China, Bosporus and the Gulf region) or many low cost carriers, would have to offset 
considerable shares of their emissions, while the more established, usually slower growing or 
stagnating, carriers would only have moderate offsetting obligations. From 2030, however, the 
individual emission growth will be considered to an increasing extent. New entrants are exempted 
from any offsetting obligations for a period of up to three years, provided that their annual 
emissions do not surpass 0.1% of global emissions in 2020 at an earlier point (§12). 
Early publications on CORSIA were published by the law firm Reed Smith Client and by CE 
Delft. The former gave an initial overview of the scheme and its geographical scope and exemptions. 
In addition, they discussed the implications of criteria for eligible offsets, as well as potential 
strategies for the EU ETS [25]. Based on an early assumption of 66 voluntarily participating states for 
the period 2021–2026, CE Delft compared the share of covered emissions with the EU ETS in its 
original and reduced scope regimes and found that some 81.5% of international air transport 
emission growth would be subject to offsetting [26]. 
In one of the first peer-reviewed journal papers on CORSIA, the scheme’s expected 
environmental and competitive effects were compared with the EU ETS [27]. The authors expect 
CORSIA to initially (in 2021) cause a small net reduction of just 1.4% of global air transport CO2 
emissions only, compared to about 2.1% for the EU ETS. However, the CORSIA impact will quickly 
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grow to, e.g., 12% in 2030. The authors further show that, due to its global approach with only few 
exceptions, the competitive effects on airlines will be smaller for CORSIA than for the EU ETS. 
2.3. Key Similarities and Differences 
As ‘market-based measures’, emission trading and offsetting schemes have an advantage over 
traditional ‘command and control’ politics because they ensure the achievement of pre-defined 
environmental targets in a cost-efficient manner. In putting (directly or indirectly) a price tag on 
emissions, producers are incentivized to reduce their negative externalities the most cost-effective 
way [27]. Table 2 summarizes the key differences between the EU ETS for aviation and CORSIA.  
Table 2. Key characteristics of CORSIA and the EU ETS. 
Scheme EU ETS CORSIA 
Fundamental 
differences 
Methodology Cap & Trade Baseline & Credit (Offsetting) 
Environmental integrity Not critical, overall cap is fixed  
Dependent on offset quality 
standards and enforcement 
Need for verification by 
authorities 
Only at emitter level 
Both at emitter and at offsetting 
project level 
Differences in 
actual 
implementation 
and application 
(coverage & 
baseline) 
Cap/Baseline 
95% of avg. 2004/2006 emissions; 
stepwise further reduction of cap 
envisaged 
Avg. 2019/2020 emissions; no 
further reduction envisaged 
Scope Intra-EEA including domestic flights 
International routes between 
participating states 
Affected carriers All airlines operating on covered routes, unless exceptions apply  
Affected aircraft Types 
Fixed wing (>5.7 t MTOM) and 
helicopters 
Fixed wing (>5.7 t MTOM) 
Both schemes aim at reducing the net climate impact of aviation as airlines have to surrender 
allowances (EU ETS) or offsets (CORSIA) for certain shares of their CO2 emissions which represent 
CO2 reductions elsewhere. Under the EU ETS, emissions from stationary installations (heat and 
power supply, as well as certain industries) and aircraft operators are capped, and producers of 
additional emissions have to buy excess allowances from other polluters participating in the scheme, 
unless it would be cheaper for them to reduce own emissions directly. CORSIA has no cap but a 
baseline and obliges carriers to compensate a certain percentage of emissions in buying offsets from 
eligible projects, like reforestation, which also represent a reduction of emissions elsewhere. 
In theory, both schemes may reach a similar environmental effectiveness, as it does not matter if 
total emissions are capped to a certain level, or if emissions exceeding a certain baseline are 
compensated by emission reductions elsewhere. However, the environmental effectiveness of 
CORSIA will strongly depend on the integrity of the mechanisms, programs, and projects which 
generate the supply of available offsets. Although the Paris Agreement does not explicitly refer to 
aviation, the agreement’s principles (article 6) for internationally transferred mitigation, like 
environmental integrity, transparency, and robust accounting, will also be critical for CORSIA [5]. 
On a global level, different carbon offset markets and quality assurance standards for carbon 
offsetting exist, like for instance the Gold Standard [28], which promise high environmental 
effectiveness. Criteria include (see, e.g., [29]) “additionality”, i.e., a reduction of emissions elsewhere 
will actually be achieved and compensate additional emissions from the aviation sector. 
When CORSIA was agreed on in 2016, exact provisions regarding its implementation and 
eligible offsets were still subject to negotiations. In the meantime, eligibility criteria for CORSIA 
emission units were approved by the ICAO Council in March, 2019. The Council also agreed on the 
implementation of a Technical Advisory Body (TAB) which will consist of experts nominated by 
Member States and recommend eligible emission units against these criteria to the Council [30]. 
However, reservations against CORSIA remain. Apart from the not very ambitious baseline, it 
is argued that missing additionality may lead CORSIA to absurdity as most offsetting projects 
would have occurred anyway (for an overview of arguments see, e.g., [31,32], and the references 
cited there). Against this background, there is a high likelihood that only a relatively small 
percentage of the nominal emission reduction will actually be achieved when investing in CORSIA 
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CERs. For example, Cames et al. (2016) assessed the current CDM framework with regard to its 
environmental integrity, i.e., to what extent projects are additional and resulting emission reductions 
not overestimated. The authors found that “73% of the potential 2013–2020 Certified Emissions 
Reduction (CER) supply have a low likelihood” and that only “7% of potential CER supply have a 
high likelihood of ensuring that emission reductions are additional and … not over-estimated” [33]. 
In this context, there is also a second fundamental disadvantage of offsetting schemes like 
CORSIA compared to emission trading schemes, as MRV will have to be undertaken not only at the 
emitter level (i.e., in this case with the airlines), but also at the sources of emission reduction, i.e., at 
the mechanism, program, and project levels. This is likely to increase overall transaction costs. 
In addition, the actual scope and baseline of CORSIA are different to the EU ETS for aviation. 
Geographically-wise, CORSIA has a larger scope, as a large share of international routes will be 
covered, even though domestic aviation is not affected. Until 2026, emissions from routes between 
~80 states representing about 77% of international RTK will be subject to CORSIA, and this share is 
supposed to rise significantly in 2027 when the BRIC states and some other countries with 
noteworthy aviation activities will have to join. As a consequence, we estimate 35.7% of worldwide 
air transport CO2 emissions in 2021 and 52% in 2027 to fall under the scope of CORSIA, compared to 
just 8% for the EU ETS (Table 3—our methodology and data used will be presented in Section 3). 
However, the general scope of CORSIA is only one side of the story, as the two schemes also 
differ with regard to their baseline/cap, above which the sector has to actually surrender offsets or 
allowances. As explained in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, the baseline of the EU ETS is 95% of 
average 2004–2006 emissions, while CORSIA will only require compensation of future annual 
emissions exceeding the 2019–2020 average. Hence, actual amount of emissions subject to offsetting 
or trading (see Section 3) is much smaller than the coverage shares from Table 3. 
Table 3. Air transport emissions from flights on routes subject to CORSIA and the EU ETS. 
Years 2021 Share of Total 2027 Share of Total 
Total emissions (Mt) 887.0 100.0% 1080.6 100.0% 
of which subject to CORSIA 316.6 35.7% 561.9 52.0% 
of which subject to EU ETS 72.3 8.1% 84.5 7.8% 
Source: Own estimations (for the calculation methodology please refer to Section 3). 
3. Assessment of Options to Maintain the EU ETS in a CORSIA World 
3.1. Range of Policy Options 
Very soon, the EU will have to decide how to continue with the EU ETS from the beginning of 
the CORSIA pilot offsetting phase. In this context, the question of how to deal with international 
intra-EU flights can be regarded as most crucial. According to Annex 16, Vol. IV, this issue seems 
clear: All EU states have agreed to join CORSIA from scratch, which regulates all international 
routes between participating states. Hence, emissions from international intra-EU flights are clearly 
subject to offsetting under CORSIA. 
However, the EU may wish not to narrow the EU ETS to domestic intra-EU flights, let alone to 
stop it completely. For instance, in the last legislative period, the European Parliament already 
described CORSIA as not sufficiently ambitious and took the position that, in any case, 
intra-European flights would have to remain part of the EU ETS [18]. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s delegated regulation for the implementation of CORSIA [34] 
indicates that the EU will not implement CORSIA in full accordance with Annex 16, Volume IV, but 
maintain elements of the EU ETS. For example, certain emissions subject to CORSIA seem to become 
exempted (like, e.g., search and rescue and training flights, or flights under visual flight or public 
service obligation rules), and MRV for emissions of EU carriers on CORSIA-routes outside the EEA 
is likely to become optional for EU-based airlines. 
Scheelhaase et al. [27] already briefly discussed possible political options (and resulting 
transaction cost) for the timeframes 2018–2020 and 2021–2035, but also considered a revival of the 
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full-scope approach of the EU ETS which, from today’s perspective, seems rather unlikely as 
international opposition would be immense. On behalf of the European NGO ‘Transport and 
Environment’, Van Velzen [35] assessed the environmental impact of different combinations of the 
EU ETS and CORSIA quantitatively by applying the AERO-MS model [36]. He basically assessed 
two scenarios, one where the EU ETS is kept for domestic EU flights only, with CORSIA being 
applied to all international flights, and one where the EU ETS is being maintained in its current form 
and where CORSIA is used for international flights to extra-EEA countries only. He further 
introduced two variants: One variant would require airlines to surrender EUA (from the EU ETS 
system) also under CORSIA for emissions from international flights departing from the EU. The 
rationale behind this is that only this way would there be a contribution of international EU air 
transport to the EU emission target for 2030 since, otherwise, CORSIA offsets may stem from 
projects in non-EU territories. The other variant, which applies only to international intra-EEA 
flights in the second scenario, would be to use EUAs for emissions above the EU ETS cap which are 
not covered by international credits (i.e., for the growth between the EU ETS cap and the CORSIA 
baseline) and CORSIA for emissions above the CORSIA baseline. 
Based on most recent information on CORSIA participation, we provide an updated, broader 
overview of possible options and estimate the resulting environmental effects in terms of emission 
net reduction, followed by a brief comment on the implications for MRV. For all options, we assume 
only one of the two market-based measures to be applied in each route group (intra-EEA domestic; 
intra-EEA international; EEA–RoW (Rest of the world); RoW–RoW international) at the same time, 
i.e., we suppose that there will be no double-regulation of the same emissions. We also assume that 
any continuation of the EU ETS would, as it was until now, refer to the scheme’s reduced 
(=intra-EEA) scope or to domestic routes only, but not to the full-scope regime as originally 
envisaged. We further consider and model the linear reduction factor of 2.2% p.a. which shall be 
applied to the EU ETS for aviation cap from 2021 according to Regulation (EU) 2017/2392. This way, 
we differentiate between the following four options which are summarized in Table 4: 
1. Implementation of CORSIA as planned and discontinuation of the EU ETS (“CORSIA only”); 
2. Implementation of CORSIA as planned and continuation of the EU ETS for domestic flights 
only (“CORSIA + EU ETS domestic”); 
3. Voluntary extension of CORSIA to domestic EEA flights and discontinuation of the EU ETS 
(“CORSIA also for EEA domestic”); 
4. Application of CORSIA to flights partly or fully outside the EEA only and full continuation of 
the reduced (=intra-EEA) scope of the EU ETS (“EU ETS for intra-EEA und CORSIA for RoW”). 
Table 4. Options for the EU ETS alongside CORSIA. 
Route Group 
Intra-EEA 
(domestic **) 
Intra-EEA 
(int’l) 
EEA–RoW 
RoW–RoW 
(int’l) 
RoW  
(domestic) 
** 
Sample country-pairs 
Intra-Italy  
Intra-Norway 
Poland–
Belgium  
Spain–
Norway 
France–
Japan  
Norway–
USA 
USA–Canada  
UAE–Ghana 
Intra-USA  
Intra-China 
Option 1 “CORSIA only” --- CORSIA CORSIA * CORSIA * --- 
Option 2 “CORSIA + EU ETS for EEA 
domestic” 
EU ETS CORSIA CORSIA * CORSIA * --- 
Option 3 “CORSIA also for EEA 
domestic” 
CORSIA CORSIA CORSIA * CORSIA * --- 
Option 4 “EU ETS for intra-EEA & 
CORSIA for RoW” 
EU ETS EU ETS CORSIA * CORSIA * --- 
* Until 2026: Only between voluntarily participating countries; from 2027: Only between countries 
whose carriers have accounted for a worldwide int’l RTK share of more than 0.5% in 2018, plus any 
volunteers. ** Domestic emissions are in principle covered of the UNFCCC Paris Agreement, which 
requires states to act. 
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3.2. Quantification of the Options’ Environmental Impacts 
3.2.1. Methodology and Data 
The bases for our estimation of the environmental impacts of the options shown above are a 
modeling methodology already applied in [27], air schedule data, and most recent information on 
CORSIA participation. 
First, we forecast global passenger traffic development and resulting CO2 emissions at the route 
level for the timeframe up to 2039. Starting point for this is the global passenger flight plan for the 
year 2016, as published by Innovata. Cargo flights could not be considered due to the poor data 
quality and limited coverage. 
As a second step, the subsequent traffic growth until 2039 is modeled on the basis of 
ICAO-CAEP-FESG’s ‘Central’ scenario [37] in increasing the frequencies on each route by the 
route-specific growth rate estimate. 
In a next step, the DLR’s 4D RACE emission tool is applied to the schedule lists to model 
related, route-specific CO2 emissions considering an average autonomous fuel efficiency increase of 
1.2% p.a. We are aware that this approach implies the route structure to remain constant as the 
ICAO-CAEP growth rates are translated into frequency increases on existing routes and not into 
new routes. However, from a global emissions perspective, it is less important whether frequencies 
on an existing route (e.g., Düsseldorf to Palma de Mallorca) increase or new flights on a similar route 
within the same geographical route-group are inaugurated (e.g., Amsterdam to Malaga). 
Finally, in an Excel-based tool, we filter the route-level CO2 estimates according to the policy 
options presented above, and apply the individual schemes’ base-lines/caps to calculate the amount 
and share of annual emissions covered by each option, as well as the accumulated emissions. 
3.2.2. Results and Discussion—Annual Emission Reduction by Option 
For the period from 2016 to 2035, we expect an average annual growth in global air transport 
CO2 emissions of about 3.3% p.a. In absolute terms, this would result in a CO2 emission increase 
from about 734 million tons in 2016 to some 1,363 million tons in 2035. 
For the four options, as well as for the continuation of the intra-EEA EU ETS alone as reference, 
we first show in Figure 3 and Table 5 the expected share of annual global CO2 air transport emissions 
subject to emission trading or offsetting, i.e., for which either offsets (CORSIA) or EUA (EU ETS) will 
have to be purchased and surrendered (emissions above cap/baseline). 
If continued in a non-CORSIA world, the EU ETS in its reduced scope would, over the years, 
tackle a slowly increasing share of emissions, from 2.1% in 2016 over 2.9% in 2021 to 5.1% in 2035 
(dotted black line). This reflects the growing share of annual emissions above the EU ETS cap which, 
from 2021, will be further reduced by the linear reduction factor of 2.2% p.a. 
However, within just a few years after the start of CORSIA, both CORSIA alone and the 
assessed combinations of CORSIA and emission trading for intra-EEA or EEA domestic routes are 
expected to regulate a larger share of emissions than the EU ETS alone. 
Hereby, the curves showing the shares of emissions subject to compensation by either CORSIA 
alone and by any combinations of CORSIA and the EU ETS run almost parallel. Obviously, with 
reduction shares of 1.5% in 2021, 11.5% in 2027, and 20% in 2035, respectively, “CORSIA only” 
(Option 1; orange line in Figure 3) will affect a smaller share of worldwide CO2 emissions than any 
combination of CORSIA and the EU ETS. This is due to the lower, more ambitious EU cap and the 
inclusion of domestic flights in the EU ETS. 
Option 3 (green line), which assumes a voluntary extension of CORSIA to EEA domestic flights 
while fully stopping the EU ETS for aviation, would only generate very limited additional 
environmental benefits compared to Option 1 (e.g., 1.6% vs. 1.5% in 2021, 11.7% vs. 11.5% in 2027, or 
20.3% vs. 20.0% in 2035). 
Interestingly, also Option 2 (continuation of the EU ETS for domestic intra-EU flights alongside 
CORSIA; red line) would only cover a slightly higher share of worldwide air transport emissions, at 
least in the long run. In the early years, due to the lower EU ETS cap, this option would cover a 
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considerably higher share of emissions than CORSIA alone (e.g., 2.0% vs. 1.5% in 2021), but over the 
years this gap would decline in relative sense (e.g., 12.2% vs. 11.5% in 2027, or 20.9% vs. 20% in 
2035)-despite the linear reduction factor. The main reason for this relatively small additional benefit 
of maintaining the EU ETS for domestic EEA flights is the low expected growth rate of just 3.2% 
(2.9%) in this traffic area for the 2020–2029 (2030–2039) period. 
The largest net effect could be achieved in maintaining the EU ETS for all intra-EEA flights, 
instead of CORSIA, and in applying the latter only to international routes which are not fully within 
the EEA (Option 4; blue line). Here, the compensation rates would increase to 4.1% vs. 1.5% in 2021, 
14.4% vs. 11.5% in 2027, or 23.1% vs. 20.0% in 2035, again compared to Option 1. 
We have not modeled any possible airline supply or passenger demand reactions, like, e.g., the 
discontinuation of flights due to increased cost and lower demand resulting from either of the 
schemes. Such reactions are likely, but they would depend on the actual prices of EUA and CERs, on 
individual airline pricing strategies, and on the route-specific price elasticities of passenger demand, 
for which the estimates found in the literature show relatively large ranges [27]. 
Table 5. Shares of worldwide passenger air traffic CO2 emissions covered by trading/offsetting in the 
period 2016 to 2035 by option. 
Year 
Option 
1—CORSIA 
Only 
Option 2—CORSIA + 
EU ETS for EEA 
Domestic 
Option 3—CORSIA 
also for EEA 
Domestic 
Option 4—EU ETS for 
Intra-EEA and CORSIA 
for RoW 
Ref—EU ETS 
Reduced Scope 
2016         2.1% 
2017         2.2% 
2018         2.4% 
2019         2.5% 
2020         2.7% 
2021 1.5% 2.0% 1.6% 4.1% 2.9% 
2022 2.5% 3.0% 2.5% 5.2% 3.1% 
2023 3.4% 4.0% 3.5% 6.2% 3.3% 
2024 4.3% 4.9% 4.4% 7.1% 3.6% 
2025 5.2% 5.8% 5.3% 8.0% 3.7% 
2026 6.0% 6.7% 6.2% 8.9% 3.9% 
2027 11.5% 12.2% 11.7% 14.4% 4.1% 
2028 12.9% 13.6% 13.1% 15.8% 4.3% 
2029 14.2% 15.0% 14.4% 17.1% 4.4% 
2030 15.2% 16.0% 15.5% 18.2% 4.5% 
2031 16.2% 17.0% 16.5% 19.2% 4.7% 
2032 17.2% 18.0% 17.5% 20.2% 4.8% 
2033 18.1% 19.0% 18.5% 21.2% 4.9% 
2034 19.1% 19.9% 19.4% 22.2% 5.0% 
2035 20.0% 20.9% 20.3% 23.1% 5.1% 
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Figure 3. Shares of worldwide passenger air traffic CO2 emissions covered by trading/offsetting in 
the period 2020 to 2035 by option. 
The above results, however, do not acknowledge that there is a high likelihood that only a 
relatively small percentage of the nominal emission reduction will actually be achieved when 
investing in CORSIA CERs. Hence, these findings represented emissions subject to offsetting (and/or 
trading) rather than emissions actually reduced by offsetting and/or trading. 
To better-and more realistically-show the actual environmental impact of the regulatory 
options, Table 6 and Figure 4 give an idea of the actual net reduction in air transport CO2 emissions. 
For this, based on the findings of [33] referred to in Section 2.3, we assume that CORSIA-CERs 
would, on average, only achieve a 20% net reduction of actual emissions. 
Table 6. Shares of worldwide passenger air traffic CO2 emissions reduced by trading/offsetting in the 
period 2016 to 2035 by option-Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) effectiveness assumption of 20%. 
Year 
Option 
1—CORSIA 
Only 
Option 2—CORSIA + 
EU ETS for EEA 
Domestic 
Option 3—CORSIA 
also for EEA 
Domestic 
Option 4—EU ETS for 
intra-EEA and CORSIA 
for RoW 
Ref—EU ETS 
Reduced Scope 
2016     2.1% 
2017     2.2% 
2018     2.4% 
2019     2.5% 
2020     2.7% 
2021 0.3% 0.8% 0.3% 3.1% 2.9% 
2022 0.5% 1.1% 0.5% 3.5% 3.1% 
2023 0.7% 1.3% 0.7% 3.9% 3.3% 
2024 0.9% 1.5% 0.9% 4.3% 3.6% 
2025 1.0% 1.7% 1.1% 4.6% 3.7% 
2026 1.2% 1.9% 1.2% 4.9% 3.9% 
2027 2.3% 3.0% 2.3% 6.2% 4.1% 
2028 2.6% 3.3% 2.6% 6.6% 4.3% 
2029 2.8% 3.6% 2.9% 6.9% 4.4% 
2030 3.0% 3.8% 3.1% 7.3% 4.5% 
2031 3.2% 4.1% 3.3% 7.6% 4.7% 
2032 3.4% 4.3% 3.5% 7.9% 4.8% 
2033 3.6% 4.5% 3.7% 8.2% 4.9% 
2034 3.8% 4.7% 3.9% 8.4% 5.0% 
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035
Option 1 - CORSIA as planned / Stop of EU ETS Option 2 - CORSIA and EU ETS (domestic intra-EEA)
Option 3 - CORSIA extended to intra-EEA domestic Option 4 - EU ETS for intra-EEA and CORSIA for RoW
Ref - EU ETS Reduced Scope
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2035 4.0% 4.9% 4.1% 8.7% 5.1% 
 
Figure 4. Shares of worldwide passenger air traffic CO2 emissions reduced by trading/offsetting in 
the period 2020 to 2035 by option-CER effectiveness assumption of 20%. 
If we assume CORSIA CERs to have, on average, an actual environmental effectiveness of only 
20%, the picture changes considerably. In the whole period until 2035, Options 1 (CORSIA only), 2 
(CORSIA + domestic EU ETS), and 3 (extension of CORSIA to EEA domestic flights) would all 
deliver lower environmental benefits than a simple continuation of the EU ETS in its reduced scope 
(4.0% to 4.9% reduction rate in 2035 compared to 5.1% for the EU ETS if continued in its current 
form). These findings massively question if CORSIA—introduced as a single market-based measure 
for international aviation—would have any environmental benefits compared to the European ETS. 
The only noteworthy improvement in environmental effectiveness compared to the EU ETS 
alone would be achieved if EU ETS permanently replaced CORSIA on intra-EEA routes (Option 4). 
Again assuming a 20% effectiveness rate for CERs, such a move by the EU would help achieving a 
net reduction share of about 3.1% in 2021, 6.2% in 2027, and 8.7% in 2035, respectively, compared to 
just 0.3%, 2.3%, and 4.0% for CORSIA alone. However, such a step might be regarded as not to be in 
line with Annex 16, Volume IV, as, e.g., the International Air Transport Association (IATA) argues 
that “CORSIA was achieved on the condition that CORSIA would be the only market-based measure 
applied to international flights” [38]. 
3.2.3. Results and Discussion—Impacts on Accumulated Emissions 
The annual reduction in emissions achieved by the assessed regulatory options is just one side 
of the story as climate change is a “stock” rather than just a “flow-problem” because the greenhouse 
effect, and eventually actual climate change, depend on the “stock”, the concentration of CO2 and 
other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Hence, it is one key pillar of the UNFCCC Paris 
Agreement to “reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible”, and to 
“undertake rapid reductions thereafter” [5]. 
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To show the contribution of the air transport sector to the global emissions stock in absolute 
terms, Table 7 contains the cumulative amount of air transport net CO2 emissions over the timeframe 
2021–2035, as well as cumulative reduction over this period. Again, we differentiate between the 
above policy options and between the 100% and 20% CORSIA CER effectiveness rate assumptions. 
In addition, the table provides cumulative emissions for the intra-EEA EU ETS (reference scenario) 
and for a “no measure” scenario. 
Table 7. Accumulated passenger air traffic CO2 emissions and emission reduction until 2021 by 
option. 
Period 
(2021  
to …) 
No 
measure 
(Mt CO2) 
EU ETS  
(ref)  
(Mt CO2) 
Option 1 
(CORSIA only) 
(Mt CO2) 
Option 2 
(CORSIA +  
EU ETS 
domestic) 
(Mt CO2) 
Option 3 
(CORSIA 
extension to EEA 
domestic, no 
ETS)  
(Mt CO2) 
Option 4  
(EU ETS for 
intra-EEA and 
CORSIA for 
RoW)  
(Mt CO2) 
CER effectiveness rate 100% 20% 100% 20% 100% 20% 100% 20% 
2021 887 861 874 884 869 880 873 884 850 859 
2022 1803 1749 1767 1796 1757 1786 1766 1796 1719 1743 
2023 2750 2664 2682 2736 2666 2720 2679 2736 2607 2652 
2024 3728 3607 3618 3706 3596 3684 3614 3705 3516 3589 
2025 4739 4580 4577 4707 4548 4678 4572 4706 4446 4554 
2026 5784 5585 5559 5739 5523 5703 5552 5738 5399 5547 
2027 6865 6621 6515 6795 6471 6751 6506 6793 6323 6561 
2028 7982 7691 7489 7884 7436 7831 7477 7881 7264 7606 
2029 9138 8796 8481 9007 8419 8945 8466 9004 8222 8681 
2030 10326 9930 9488 10158 9417 10087 9470 10155 9193 9782 
2031 11546 11093 10510 11339 10430 11258 10489 11335 10179 10910 
2032 12801 12288 11549 12550 11458 12459 11524 12545 11179 12066 
2033 14090 13514 12605 13793 12502 13691 12575 13787 12195 13250 
2034 15415 14773 13677 15068 13563 14954 13644 15061 13227 14464 
2035 16778 16066 14767 16376 14642 16250 14729 16368 14275 15708 
Cumulative 
reduction compared 
to “no measure” 
712 2011 402 2136 528 2049 410 2503 1070 
In total, over the period 2021–2035, cumulative passenger air transport CO2 emissions are 
expected to reach almost 16,800 Mt. 
If the EU ETS stayed in operation but without CORSIA, this amount would be reduced by 712 
Mt. CORSIA alone, as envisaged by ICAO, would achieve a cumulative reduction by 402 Mt if an 
average CER effectiveness rate of 20% is assumed. 
As the overall reduction of emissions that would be generated by Options 2 (maintaining the 
EU ETS for domestic operations) and 3 (voluntary extension of CORSIA to domestic intra-EEA 
flights) is also expected to remain below the environmental contribution of the EU ETS alone (528 
and 410 Mt, respectively), the only option for the EU to increase the environmental effectiveness of 
CORSIA beyond EU ETS levels would be to Option 4, i.e., a permanent replacement of CORSIA on 
intra-EEA routes by the EU ETS. 
3.3. MRV implications 
Common rules regarding MRV are crucial both for the EU ETS and for CORSIA, to ensure that 
the schemes’ implementation and handling do not differ between countries and airlines. Key actors 
are the aircraft operators (AO), the competent authorities (CA), and the verifiers. Both the EU ETS 
and CORSIA require both one-off and annual MRV tasks during the compliance cycle which is, 
exemplarily for the EU ETS, illustrated in Figure 5: 
• The main one-time task is the preparation (AO), check (CA), and approval (CA) of monitoring 
plans. This usually happens once for each aircraft operator under each of the schemes, be it 
when the MBM is introduced, or in case a new carrier joins the measure, or if there are any 
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significant changes, such as the fuel estimation methodology, IT systems of relevance, or the 
organizational structure [39]. For the EU ETS, Article 14(2) of the “Monitoring and Reporting 
Regulation (MRR)” EU No 601/2012 [40] includes a minimum list of the typical changes which 
would require an update of the monitoring plan; 
• During the compliance cycle, each AO has to compile an annual emissions report for the 
preceding year and provide it to its CA, together with a verification report prepared by a 
verifier; 
• The CA is required to ensure that the emissions have been monitored and reported in 
accordance with the legislation (e.g., the MRR for the EU ETS). It will perform full or spot 
checks and may request an improvement report or start legal action. 
 
Figure 5. Compliance cycle of the EU ETS for aviation. Source: [41]. 
These MRV activities induce transaction costs both at the CA and AO levels. Costs of meeting 
the regulatory requirements will largely depend on the scope and type of the operation (e.g., 
scheduled flights by the same aircraft types on the same routes vs. ad-hoc operations of, e.g., 
business jet operators) and on the operators’ internal processes. 
At first sight, the MRV processes of the EU ETS and CORSIA seem very similar, but we observe 
fundamental differences in detail, such as the following issues [42]: 
• Technical exemptions, especially regarding exempted flight categories, aircraft types, routes, 
and operators; 
• Eligible fuel monitoring methods and thresholds for simplified monitoring methods; 
• MRV for flights between non-EEA countries: Mandatory under CORSIA but voluntary in the 
according to the delegated regulation; 
• Country of accreditation of verifiers. 
As a consequence, if both systems were running in parallel (Options 2 and 4), airlines would be 
required to monitor, report, and verify their emissions according to two different MRV systems, 
which would cause additional administrative effort despite relatively limited additional 
environmental benefits in the long run.  
For EU carriers, this additional administrative burden was, however, softened by the 
Commission’s delegated regulation for the implementation of CORSIA [33], which basically applies 
EU ETS MRV requirements for European operators to CORSIA. Non-EEA carriers, which provide 
intra-EEA services subject to the EU ETS in Options 2 and 4, would have to deal with two different 
regimes, though. This is because they would have to report their CORSIA emissions to their national 
CA (according to Annex 16, Volume IV) and their intra-European emissions subject to the EU ETS to 
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their responsible CA in Europe, in accordance with the MRR requirements of the EU ETS. A more 
practical solution could be to fully apply CORSIA MRV to the EU ETS. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
Although they belong both to the group of market-based measures aiming at reducing 
aviation’s climate impact, CORSIA and the EU ETS for aviation are not directly comparable, as both 
their approaches (offsetting versus emission trading) and their geographical applications and 
baseline/cap differ. On paper, CORSIA is expected to net-reduce some 75–80% of the worldwide air 
transport emission growth on international routes, albeit only from the 2019–2020 baseline period. In 
addition, there are serious concerns about the environmental effectiveness of the CORSIA CERs. In 
contrast, the EU ETS includes EEA domestic air transport and has a much earlier cap (95% of 
average 2004–2006 emissions), which means that a higher share of emissions is actually capped, but 
only within Europe (EEA). 
Especially in the early 2020s, when the emission growth under CORSIA will still be low, a 
consideration of emissions from domestic intra-EEA routes and the more ambitious cap of the EU 
ETS would play a significant role. Thus, the overall environmental effectiveness (also with regard to 
national and EU climate goals) of the measures would increase if the EU ETS stayed in operation, be 
it for intra-EU domestic flights or even for all intra-EU routes, replacing CORSIA there as an 
equivalent measure. Another option to increase the scope of CORSIA at least to some extent could be 
to voluntarily extend it to domestic EEA flights. If an environmental effectiveness of the CORSIA 
CERs of just 20% is assumed, the additional contribution of keeping the EU ETS in operation will be 
even larger. For this scenario, a continuation of the intra-European EU ETS in addition to the 
introduction of CORSIA on other international routes—against likely political resistance at 
ICAO-level—would result in a cumulative emission reduction in the period 2021–2035 by about 
1070 Mt CO2, while CORSIA alone (without the EU ETS) would just achieve a reduction by some 400 
Mt. In addition, a potential inclusion of non-CO2 effects is likely to happen much quicker within an 
EU ETS than at the global (CORSIA) level. 
Administrative-wise, with regard, for example, to exemptions and eligible fuel monitoring 
methods, the CORSIA MRV system as specified in Annex 16, Vol. IV, could be applied to the EU ETS 
to reduce transaction costs and to assure similar or even identical MRV standards worldwide. 
However, the EU seems to go its own way as it plans to implement CORSIA not in accordance with 
Annex 16, Volume IV, but in line with the EU ETS MRV requirements. 
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